University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Staff
Publications

U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs

12-12-2003

Understanding Threats to Scientific Openness
James B. Petro
Stanford University School of Medicine, jbpetro@hotmail.com

David A. Relman
Stanford University School of Medicine, relman@stanford.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/veterans

Petro, James B. and Relman, David A., "Understanding Threats to Scientific Openness" (2003). U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs Staff Publications. 22.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/veterans/22

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs Staff Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

searchers (2). The letter shown(fig: £^:ttsonstcu
Te*We,1A1

;

.

..

.

.!"'**. ! .nf|i.
.dAS ''--'§;ltt
S;
.
5iR^
._ t_ wi**,
J.
Ais
*ir 5>}Xl_.s.8S
.
sp5t
Vtig"XS
1.t , ...................................
lAt,,*:*:.a.i
-t5
. i
51*
tu
,

....j

* 45',t
^,.

..

iw ......

w

w.*.9

Ail_

.

_A
.,

ut$8t
;l

,

r

i7.fi4
* entltlc

,

X

POLICY
FORUM
so may rely upon dual-useinformation.
With publicationsfrom nearly50 years
ago, a marginallyskilledterroristcouldproducea crudeagentforuse in a limitedbioterrorattack.However,usingmorerecentlypublishedresearchfindingsandprocedures,casualtyratesassociatedwith suchan incident
wouldincreasedramatically.
Thus,ourinability to restrictaccessto alreadypublishedresearchin no wayabsolvesthesciand national security
communitiesof our
X4s,
X responsibility
to addressfuturefindings
of concern.
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James B. Petro* and David A. Relman

The

scientificcommunityis beingconfrontedby publicconcernsthatfreely
availablescientific informationmay
be exploitedby terrorists.Differingpoints
of view amongscientiststhreatento complicatediscussionintendedto addressthese
concerns. Skepticism of the existence,
breadth,andseverityof the threatposedby
would-bebioweaponeers
is compoundedby
the failureto find clearevidenceof biological weaponsin Iraq.Also, someevenquestion the extentto whichopen-sourcescientific materialcontributesto the threat.
Recentpublicdiscussionsregardingthe
potentialfor open-sourcescienceto enable
bioterrorist
activitieshaveoccurredin a vacuum,withoutexamplesof"real-world"activity.Thisis largelybecausetheneedfornational securityprofessionalsto safeguard
sourcesinculcatesa cultureof secrecyunlike
the opennessof the life sciencecommunity.
Onepotentialcontribution
of the national securitycommunityis the opportunity,
albeit limited,to educatescientistsregarding
currentandemergingthreatsthroughunclassified case studies.The followingbrief descriptionof some recentfindingsprovides
insightinto activitiesof potentialexploiters
and emphasizesthe importanceof
closerinteractionbetweenthe scien- 5
tific andsecuritycommunities.
Documentsrecoveredfroman al- !
Qaidatrainingcampin Afghanistan (I) in 2001 haveshedlighton proce- duresandmethodologiesusedby al- Qaidain its effortsto establisha biologicalwarfare(BW) program.Individuals
involvedin this effortapparentlyreliedon
scientificresearchandinformation
obtained
collegiallyfrompublicand privatesources
(see figure,aboveright)(2).
Booksfoundat the campdescribeStatesponsoredBW activitiesandoutlinethehisJ. B. Petro is with the Joint MilitaryIntelligenceCollege,
BollingAFB,Washington, DC 20340 5100; D. A. Relman
is with the Departmentsof Microbiology& Immunology,
and of Medicine,StanfordUniversitySchool of Medicine,
Stanford,CA 94305, and with VeteransAffairs,PaloAlto
Health Care System, PaloAlto, CA 94304, USA.
*To whom correspondence should be addressed.
E-mail:jbpetro@hotmail.com
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takethe lead in part'60s thatprovideda methodfor
neringwith national
isolating,culturing,identifying,
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security professionand producingbacteria,includalsto draftguidelines
ing Bacillus anthracis and
a-_.
. .
for identifying reClostridiumbotulinum.Handsearch of concern
writtenlettersand BW primers
and weighing the
foundtogetherat the same site
benefits to national
suggestthatal-Qaida's
th L'''t+*'"L'
"W%}. tWi^W\.
:: security against the
BW initiativeincluded
L
cost to opencommurecruitment
of individ- "^
@*
uals with Ph.D.-level
nicationof futurelife
sclence
c .lscovery
expertlse who sup- 11>o11w^g**
ported planning and "-^**
(5).Furthermore,
sciB
entistscanhelpensuresecuntyproacqulsluoneIIorts Y XWq.
fessionals maintain a working
their familiaritywith
toolsand
the scientificcommu- Documen1ts captured at an lmowledgeof cutting-edge
nity. When specific al-Qaidatraining facility. datawith nationalsecuntyimplicainformationwas not Names annd locations have tions.Sucha partnership
shouldincludescientistswho aregivensecuavailablein print,al- been remo)ved.
nty clearancearldnationalsecunty
Qaida scientists apparentlytook advantageof symposiawhere participantsthat representthe spectrumof
theycouldobtaintipsandtechniques relevantagencieswith a strongbackgrourld
m
directly from unsuspecting re- andtaining in thelife sciences(6).
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ure, above)revealsplansto acquire
bacterialstrains,vaccines,produc_
tionequipment,
training,andexpert_
ise. The scientificcommunityneeds
to be awareof this kind of activity.
Identification
of a recentlyconstructed
laboratory(3) with equipmentand suppliesthat
couldbe used to producebiologicalagents
withina few kilometersof the sitewherethe
BW-relateddocumentswere foundstrongly
suggests that al-Qaidaproceededbeyond
simplyreviewing"dual-use"
literature.
Like al-Qaida, the Japanese terrorist
groupAum Shinrikyosoughtto developan
intrinsicBW program;these efforts are a
dangerousdeparturefrom the activitiesof
other groups, which historically have
sought to acquirecompletedweapons or
producecrude preparationsof toxins and
chemicals(4). Othergroupsthatpursuean
independentBW programin the futureal-
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information] be provided to me: al-Qaida documents discovered by U.S. forces in
Afghanistan that pertain to the research materials referenced in the Petro and Relman
article “Understanding Threats to Scientific Openness” published in the 12 December
2003 issue of Science. Should portions of these documents be deemed too sensitive to be
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